Australia needs to stay vigilant about 'carrots' the US offers: scholar

Editor's Note:

It seems that the frosty China-Australia relations have started to thaw faster. After three years, the bilateral high-level dialogue has resumed and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has announced a visit to China later this year. However, the relationship between the two countries is still clouded by several factors, Washington's constant pursuit of containing China and the security pact AUKUS, announced two years ago this week, among others. In a conversation with Global Times (GT) reporter Xia Wenxin, Joseph Camilleri (Camilleri), Emeritus Professor at La Trobe University in Melbourne and a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Social Sciences, shared his views on issues including China-Australia ties and the development of AUKUS.

GT: On September 15, 2021, the US, Australia and the UK announced a new security pact called AUKUS. After the establishment of this partnership, you commented that the agreement was "a story of recklessness and delusion." Now two years later, how do you see the development of AUKUS?

Camilleri: AUKUS has affected Australia's situation, and is a source of tension. What is unfortunate about AUKUS, in my view, is the impact it has on Australia. Much of this is about future "defense" planning. There are various forms of military cooperation between the US and Australia which have become closer and closer. AUKUS has simply given them another boost.

I called it a story of "recklessness and delusion" because it places Australian assets, resources and the country as a whole in a military relationship with the US, over which it has only limited control. And this tends to exacerbate its relations with other countries, China, of course, but also many other countries, especially in Southeast Asia. I am quite concerned about what this might mean for the future - in particular, whether it might lead to some kind of arms race in the Asia-Pacific region.

GT: Has AUKUS become an obstacle to China-Australia relations? How will this partnership affect the development of the relationship in the future?

Camilleri: It's just one more obstacle on top of the other obstacles. To find out what lies behind AUKUS and much else that goes hand in hand with the Australia-US military alliance, China, its people and its government cannot but ask the following questions: Are these arrangements aimed at China? What is the purpose of these arrangements? Why is the US so keen to have these kinds of provocative security relationships in the Asia-Pacific?

The US is keen to maintain its dominance in the Asia-Pacific region, where it has projected military far beyond its boundaries virtually unchallenged since the end of World War II. It is concerned that China's rise may pose a threat to its dominant position.

What the US wants to do in Asia-Pacific is to build as many security relationships as it can and make its military planning and weapons systems as closely interconnected as possible with the military establishments of its allies and partners. It sees this strategy as crucial to bolstering its position in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The US is presently intent on constructing an overwhelming military presence in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. AUKUS is but one prong in this strategy. 

That is the problem we're facing: We have a major power that has been since World War II a superpower and the dominant power in the world, and it wants to preserve its dominance at all costs. But there are other countries, most notable China, that are rising and are committed to notions of multipolarity. Here you have a dangerous tension. And Australia, unfortunately, has been caught in the middle of these conflicting views as to what the future should look like.

GT: While Pillar 1 seems to face various difficulties, AUKUS has announced an ambitious Pillar 2 with the hope that more countries will join. What do you think is the motive of AUKUS countries behind such a move? And how likely is it that more countries will participate in the program in the future?

Camilleri: The intention of Pillar 2 has more to do with how these three countries - Australia, the US and the UK - will extend their cooperation beyond the nuclear power submarines and whether they will involve other types of defense capabilities, including artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, among others. That's one part of Pillar 2, one part of expanding the strategic military relationship. 

The other part is to bring other US allies into practical forms of military cooperation. Several have been mentioned: hypersonics, cyber security and anti-submarine warfare, the emphasis being on operational and practical cooperation.

I don't see too many countries being terribly enthusiastic about joining Pillar 2 - maybe Japan or South Korea, but even their joining is not exactly guaranteed, nor is it clear what form it will take. However, the underlying idea is clear: it is to build the political, diplomatic and military infrastructure that will enable the US to maintain dominance in the region. That's the name of the game. It may create problems in the short to medium term. We need to be concerned about these looming dangers. 

GT: In addition to AUKUS, Australia and the US have deepened their military partnership. For instance, Washington has made a commitment to help Australia produce guided multiple-launch rocket systems by 2025. What do you think of this "help" from the US? How will it affect Australia? 

Camilleri: The defense links between the two countries, including the AUKUS arrangement, will probably deepen as there is an increasing level of interoperability. From the point of view of the US military establishment, what Australia offers is real estate assets, that is to say, it can operate from different parts of the Australian continent which provides it not just with landing and refueling rights but also with platforms from which it can operate its land, sea and air forces.

And I suppose for the Australian military, the US offers a few "carrots." It supplies Australia with more advanced technology and perhaps some increased intelligence cooperation. This is just one part of the wider picture that I described before. The US is, in some respects, a declining power, and therefore needs to boost its position by relying on what its allies and security partners can provide. This is why there is so much emphasis, particularly under the Biden administration, on developing, maintaining and strengthening military alliance arrangements on the European front as well as in the Asia-Pacific.

Australia is becoming more and more enmeshed and integrated into US military planning. Against this backdrop, many Australians are challenging and questioning the current direction of Australian defense policy, even many within the Labor Party, the party in government. 

I expect there will be an ongoing debate within Australia for some time to come. The wider questions of Australia's place in the region and the world will become a major subject of public discussion for some time to come.

GT: A recent article in The Economist suggests that if a war were to break out with China, Australia seems most willing to fight alongside the US. Do you agree? Is such an argument wishful thinking only on the US' part?

Camilleri: I don't think these opinions carry a great deal of rational weight. Some years ago, a previous Liberal foreign minister made it clear that there is no commitment under the ANZUS alliance for Australia to join the US in a war against China, for example, in relation to Taiwan.

Australia would think many times before it became involved in such a conflict. But there is always a danger that this may happen. This danger needs to be taken seriously. The challenge, as I see it, is not what would happen in the event of a China-US war. The issue that we must all confront is: how do we make sure such a war never takes place? There's too much talk in Australia and elsewhere, even by those who oppose AUKUS, about what should not happen, and not enough about what should happen. 

We need to think about what alternatives look like, and the alternative is to try and build a regional framework in which all countries in Asia-Pacific, large and small, powerful and not so powerful, can coexist in relative peace. That's what Australia, among others, should be committed to.

GT: How do you see the role of the US in China-Australia relations? Some argue that structural conflicts in the China-US relationship constrain China-Australia ties. Do you share this view?

Camilleri: We've been discussing a major conflict that has emerged in recent times. At the moment, the conflict between China and the US is largely geopolitical, not military. This is something that the entire international community must be concerned about. We have to find ways whereby China and the US can live in peace with each other. It's critical for the future of both countries as well as the world. We cannot allow the present tensions to keep rising.

The US administration, in particular the US security establishment, has never fully consulted the American people as to how they should plan the future of the country's foreign and security policy. The American people have never been consulted and have never had the opportunity to participate in a serious public discussion of these issues. The same is true of Australia.

As we have seen, there is an emerging structural conflict. It is something we must all work to prevent and diffuse as best we can, and Australia should be playing its part. Unfortunately, it is not doing very well. So must other regional powers and, of course, the great powers, including the US and China.

GT: On September 7, China and Australia held their first high-level dialogue in three years. What kind of signals do you think this event has released? Does it lay the foundation for further easing in China-Australia relations? What suggestions do you have for the Australian government to improve its relations with China?

Camilleri: There are some positive signs. These are rather early signs which haven't yet gone very far. Part of the challenge we face is to identify the good things Australia and China could be doing together that they're not doing at present. It's very important that we put this question on the table in high-level dialogues. Also, in future discussions, Chinese and Australian government leaders must address the question, what are the good things that our two countries could be doing but are not presently doing? Two things stand out.

First, there is a great opportunity to develop the bilateral relationship. What we ought to place at the forefront of the relationship is not "strategic competition." Far more important is a better cultural understanding of each other. For Australia, this means a wide-ranging program with China's engagement to develop a better understanding of Chinese culture, history, civilization, language and, perhaps most importantly, Chinese perspectives on the emerging, rapidly transforming world order. Hopefully, the same question is being addressed in China, which is far bigger and more influential than Australia.

Ultimately, what matters most is people-to-people contacts and connections. Therefore, at the center of Australia-China discussions should be this question: What should we do to develop people-to-people relations between these two countries on a large scale? Such culturally based understanding and cooperation can greatly assist the bilateral relationship, in particular, mutually beneficial economic development, not least in trade, investment, and technological cooperation. 

The second thing has to do with multilateral relations. Australia and China should discuss seriously at the highest level what initiatives the two countries can take to advance the prospects for disarmament and demilitarization in our region. With the loosening and demotion of military alliances and appropriate diplomatic steps, we can work towards more effective forms of both regional and global governance. China and Australia should work together toward achieving urgently needed reform of the United Nations and greater regional cooperation on many fronts, including an economically and environmentally constructive code of conduct for the South China Sea. There is so much positive work that could be done. The time has come to do it, and do it with a renewed sense of urgency.